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PATENT INFRINGEMENT: REDEFINING THE "MAKING"
STANDARD TO INCLUDE PARTIAL ASSEMBLIES-Paper
ConvertingMachine Co. v. Magna-GraphicsCorp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
In PaperConverting Machine Co. v. Magna-GraphicsCorp., I the Federal Circuit2 rejected the traditional operable assembly standard for determining a "making." '3 In its place, the court adopted a more flexible
standard that included partial assemblies that have no significant noninfringing purpose. This test for infringement significantly broadens patent
protection and further restricts the permissible activity of competitors
allowed during the patent term. The court's standard grants the patent
owner a de facto monopoly beyond the expiration date by restricting
competitors from making preparations to enter the market after the patent
expires. The decision represents a movement by the Federal Circuit toward
a much more protectionist view of patents. In achieving this result, however, the court disregarded strong precedent 4 and left patent law uncertain.
This Note argues that Paper Converting improperly rejected the traditional operable assembly standard for determining a "making" in light of
the prior case law, the established infringement doctrines, and the congressional balancing of competing interests under the patent grant. First, this
Note demonstrates the applicability of Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.5 and its operable assembly standard to the facts of PaperConverting.
Second, it argues that Congress, in weighing the competing interests of the
patent grant, incorporated the operable assembly standard into the balance
as a limitation upon the patentee's exclusive rights. 6 Third, this Note
highlights the uncertainty caused by the Paper Converting standard for
infringement and its negative impact on the doctrine of contributory
infringement. 7 Fourth, it demonstrates the limiting effect of PaperConverting on preparations of competitors made during the patent term for
1. 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvements
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25 (codified at28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)). The Federal Circuit is
a new article III court established to vest in one appellate court, instead of twelve, the power to
definitively adjudicate patent cases, adding doctrinal stability and uniformity in patent law. S. REP. No.
275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 11-15.
3. See infra note 14.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 15-34.
5. 406 U.S. 518 (1972). The Deepsouth standard requires the device be assembled in a fully
functional and operable manner. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
6. For a discussion of the exclusive rights of a patent grant see infra notes 8-10 and accompanying

text.
7.

For a discussion of the doctrine of contributory infringement, see infra note 18.
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post-patent market entry. Finally, this Note concludes that the Federal
Circuit should have retained the traditional operable assembly standard
instead of rewriting patent law.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE "MAKING" STANDARD

A patent grants to its owner the right to exclude others from "making,
using, or selling" the patented invention for a term of seventeen years. 8
Under section 271 of the Patent Act, 9 any unauthorized making, using, or
selling of the patented invention within the United States during the patent
term infringes the patent. ' 0 Infringement occurs only when all the elements
claimed in the patent, 1' or their equivalents, 12 are combined in the manner
described by the patent. The omission of any one of the claimed elements
avoids infringement. 13 This definition of infringement requires a stringent
standard under section 271 for determining at what point an infringer
"makes" the patented invention. The traditional "making" standard 14
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). "Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, . . . for the
term of seventeen years, . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States.
... Id. The patent grant represents an exchange between the public
and the inventor. The inventor receives a bundle of exclusive rights for seventeen years. The public
receives immediate disclosure of the invention and the later unlimited right to exploit it.
One might expect the seventeen-year period to represent an informed legislative choice of the length
of time needed to provide the proper incentive, but in fact, the choice is more a result of historical factors
that simply have been perpetuated. See White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
839, 840-42 (1956); 4 D. CHtSUM, PATENTS § 16.04[1] (1983).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent." This simply incorporates the patent grant of § 154 in defining
infringement. Section 271(a) is written in disjunctive form so that any one of the three activities,
making, using, or selling, alone constitutes infringement.
11. In a patent application, the inventor must clearly state what is claimed as the invention. A
patent sets forth these claims, and they are strictly scrutinized in an infringement action. See 4 D.
CHIsuM, PATENTS § 18.03[1] (1978).

12. The doctrine of equivalents defines as infringing all devices that perform "substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the patented invention. Graver
Tank Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). This prevents a competitor from making
insignificant changes and thereby avoiding infringement. Id. at 607. See 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.04
(1984).
13. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro I), 365 U.S. 336, 344-45 (1961);
Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. 336 (1842); Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 552 (Ct. Cl.
1976); Strumskis v. United States, 474 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
In Prouty, the Court held that the defendant's use of two of the three major components of a patented
plow was not an infringement. The patent had been issued for the sum total of all the elements, and a use
of all but one of the claimed elements avoided infringement. 41 U.S. at 340-41. This rule prevents the
patentee from exercising exclusive control over any single element or grouping of elements short of the
whole combination. Aro (1), 365 U.S. at 344-45.
14. The traditional standard required that the device be assembled to the point of operation before it
infringed the patent. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528-29. Once this degree of assembly is achieved, the
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required not only that all the claimed elements be present, but that the
infringer assemble the device in a final operable form.
The issue of the proper "making" standard for section 271 came before
the Supreme Court in DeepsouthPacking Co. v. Laitram Corp. 15 In Deepsouth, the defendant manufactured all the parts of a patented shrimp
deveining device but did not assemble it. Instead, the manufacturer shipped
the parts to foreign buyers who assembled the devices outside the United
States. Under section 271, the assembly abroad was not a direct infringement1 6 because the patent laws do not have extraterritorial effect. 17 Absent
a direct infringement, the defendant could not be a contributory infringer. 18

patent is infringed and any use or sale of the device also infringes. Any supplier of a material part is then
liable as a contributory infringer. See.infra note 18. Disassembly of a completed device does not avoid
infringement. See infra note 28.
15. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
16. Direct infringement is defined in § 271(a). See supra note 10. Section 271 also defines the
corollary infringement doctrines of active inducement, § 271(b), contributory infringement, § 271(c),
and exportation to actively induce infringement, § 271(f).
17. Section 271 makes it clear that making or using the patented device outside the United States is
not an infringement. Infringement must occur within the United States and during the patent term. The
patent system can grant no rights that extend beyond the territories of the United States. Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857). The recent addition of § 271(f) does not add extraterritorial effect to the patent laws but focuses instead solely on activity in this country. See infra notes
74-76 and accompanying text.
18. The doctrine of contributory infringement adds to the protection given the patentee and
modifies the application of a strict operable assembly standard. Under the operable assembly standard,
a manufacturer avoided infringement by leaving out one element and relying on the ultimate purchaser
to supply the missing element to complete the device. The classic case is Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas.
74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). The patent there covered a kerosene lamp base with a chimney.
The defendant, relying on the combination rule, manufactured and sold only the lamp base. The glass
chimneys were readily available to the consumer purchaser who merely had to insert them into the
defendant's lamp bases. By doing so, the consumer became the patent infringer, and the manufacturer
avoided liability while still competing with the patentee.
Relying on joint tort liability, the court found the defendant liable as ajoint infringer with the ultimate
purchaser because of his efforts to bring the lamp into use and infringe the patent. The court held that
strictly construing the direct infringement requirements would leave the patent useless. The patentee's
only remedy would be against the purchasers-"a consequence which, considering the small value of
each separate lamp, and the trouble and expense of prosecution, would make the complainants helpless
and remediless." Id. at 80. This case was one of the first to adopt the doctrine of contributory
infringement. See generally 4 D. CHISuM, PATMr § 17.02 (1980).
The 1952 Patent Act codified the doctrine of contributory infringement in § 271(c). The statutory
definition requires the component to be a material part of the invention and not a staple commodity
suitable for a substantial noninfringing use. For a discussion of a "material part" and a "substantial
noninfringing use", see 4 D. CmsuM, PATENTs § 17.03[3-4] (1980). In addition, the seller must have
knowledge that the component is especially made or adapted for use in infringing the patent. Id.
Contributory infringement cannot stand alone-there must be a direct infringement. In Aro(I), the
Court stated, "It is plain that § 271(c)-a part of the Patent Code enacted in 1952-made no change in
the fundamental precept that there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct
infringement." 365 U.S. at 341. An operable assembly violation of the patentee's exclusive rights by
the ultimate maker or user is the only way a court can also find a contributor to be an infringer.
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The question in Deepsouth, therefore, centered on whether the manufacture of all the component parts alone, without assembly, constituted a
direct infringement under section 271 (a). 19 The court below had held that
this was a "making" and that the word "makes" in section 271(a) should be
given an ordinary meaning and not some artificial, technical construction. 20 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit had adopted a substantial
21
manufacture test for infringement.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of
infringement. 22 The majority refuted the Fifth Circuit's substantial manufacture test, adopting the much narrower operable assembly definition of
"makes." 23 The Court held that a patent only protects the operable assembly of the invention and not the manufacture of its parts. 24 The Court ruled
that the operable assembly definition of "makes" was so firmly embedded
in the patent law that it was unassailable absent a congressional recasting of
25

the statute.
The majority in Deepsouth relied heavily on the approach of the Second
Circuit in Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea (Andrea I),26 a case decided
before the codification of section 271 in the 1952 Patent Act. In Andrea I,
19. "The sales question thus resolves itself into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth 'make'
(and then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention
."406
U.S.
at 527.
20. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 938-39 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406
U.S. 518 (1972).
21.
Id. at 939. Under the substantial manufacture test, the manufacture of significant or substantial
parts of the patented invention infringes the patent. This usually covers the "heart" of the invention or
the inventive concept. In the wake of the Deepsouth opinion, many commentators argued for a "heart of
the invention" or "substantial manufacture" test for infringement under § 271(a). See, e.g., Note.
Tightening the Screws on Minor Assemblies Abroad: The Meaning of "Makes" Under the Patent
Infringement Statute, 57 IowA L. REV. 889 (1972); Note, Infringement and Assembly Abroad-Patent
Protection Takes a Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 662 (1973); Note, Operable Versus
SubstantialAssembly ofPatented Combinations:A CritiqueofDeepsouth v. Laitram, 26 STAN. L. REv.
893 (1974); Note, PatentLaw-Infringement ofCombinationPatent-A PatentedMachineWhose Parts
Are Produced in the United States Is Not "Made" Within the United States Within the Meaning of
Section 271(a) of the PatentAct If Its Component PartsAre Exported in Unassembled Form, 26 VAND.
L. REV. 201 (1973).
22. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
23. Id. at 527-29.
24. Id. at 528.
25. Id. In addition, the Court concluded that in light of the nation's "historical antipathy to
monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster competition," it should not
expand the patent rights by overruling an established line of precedents without a clear and certain
signal from Congress. Id. at 530-31.
Congress acted on this problem by adding two new subsections to § 271 in the fall of 1984.
Subsection (f), approved after the Paper Converting decision, includes as infringement the exportation
of unassembled goods in such a way as to induce a combination abroad that would infringe the patent if
done within the United States. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(f) (West 1985). This addresses the activity at issue in
Deepsouth. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
26. 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935).
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the Second Circuit held that exporting assembled radio receivers without
vacuum tubes inserted did not infringe the patent because the patent only
protected the physical connection of the electrical circuitry in an operable
relationship. 27 Two years later, when the case was appealed for a second
time to the Second Circuit, the court held that the patent had been infringed. 2 8 New evidence revealed that the defendant had formed the protected electrical relationship by placing the tubes in the sockets in order to
test the receivers before the sets left the factory. The court found infringement in this operable assembly of the receivers even though it was purely
29
for testing purposes.
27. Id. at 629. The defendants manufactured all the parts of the patented radio receivers except the
vacuum tubes which were purchased on the open market. They assembled the receivers absent the tubes
which were separately packaged and placed into the same carton as the receivers. To operate the radios,
the purchaser needed only to place the tubes in their sockets and plug the radio into an electrical outlet.
The claims at issue covered a method for producing alternating currents which depended on the
relationship between the circuitry and the vacuum tubes. The court held that this relationship could not
be attained until there was a "physical connection between the terminals of the circuits and the
electrodes of the vacuum tube." Id. at 628. The patentee suffered no wrong until the combination was
formed; the sale of elements capable of forming the patented invention, standing alone, did not violate
the patentee's exclusive rights. Id.
28. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea (Andrea II), 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937). The entire
combination was formed to test the receivers, so the invention was "made" and the patent infringed.
The court held that once the patented combination is assembled, later disassembly will not erase the
infringement. Id.
29. It is unclear whether theAndrea11court, however, considered the testing the only reason for the
finding of infringement. The court first used the following language which seems to support a
substantial manufacture test: "Where the elements of an invention are thus sold in substantially unified
and combined form, infringement may not be avoided by a separation or division of parts which leaves
to the purchaser a simple task of integration." Id. at 613. However, the court then cited with approval the
Andrea I rationale that no infringement occurs until the parts are associated to form an operable
assembly. Id. Due to this seemingly contradictory language, Judge Swan, the author of Andrea I,
dissented in part in Andrea! because he was not sure of the effect of the majority view on the Andrea I
opinion. See id. at 615 (Swan, J., dissenting in part).
Because of this ambiguity in theAndreacases, the dissent inDeepsouthwas suspicious of the weight
given Andrea I by the majority. Justice Blackmun felt that Andrea I did not represent the "prevailing
law" adopted by Congress in the Patent Act because it was undermined by the second case. Deepsouth,
406 U.S. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The two Andrea cases can be reconciled without affecting the operable assembly holding ofAndrea I.
The Second Circuit in Andrea II was determined to find infringement in the sale of the receivers in
addition to the infringement by manufacture. The court wanted to indicate that once the receivers had
been assembled, later disassembly did not prevent the sale from infringing. The court made it clear that
a manufacturer cannot avoid infringement by disassembling the machine after the complete assembly
has occured. Hence the language fromAndrea II, "Where the elements of an invention are thus sold in
substantially unified and combined form, infringement may not be avoided by a separation or division
of parts which leaves to the purchaser a simple task of integration," 90 F.2d at 613, relates only to the
sale of these partially disassembled radio receivers. This interpretation is consistent with the facts of the
case and the court's citation and reinforcement of Andrea I in the second case. Despite the seemingly
ambiguous stance of the court in Andrea II, Deepsouth correctly represents the holding of the two cases
as requiring an operable assembly before a finding of infringement.
Deepsouth was clearer in its approach to the same sales question. Infringement by sale simply
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Deepsouth concluded that Congress incorporated the Andrea I operable
assembly standard into the meaning of "makes" in section 271.30 The
Court found no indication in the legislative history of section 271 of an
intent to change the law of direct infringement. Instead, it perceived an
intention to simply codify existing law. 3 1 The Court found support for this
conclusion in opinions of the Third and Seventh Circuits that followed the
Andrea I operable assembly approach in interpreting section 271.32 The
Court concluded that any finding of infringement under section 271 must
33
be based on a complete operable assembly of the patented invention.
Anything less than a complete assembly would not be an infringement.
Cases since Deepsouth have continued to apply this strict operable assem34
bly requirement.
II.

THE PAPER CONVERTING DECISION

The Federal Circuit in PaperConvertingMachine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 35 interpreted Deepsouth so narrowly that it stripped Deepsouth
of all precedential value. The court deviated significantly from the operable
assembly standard and adopted a "making" standard closer to a substantial
manufacture test for infringement.
depended on whether the device was ever "made." See supra note 19. If the manufacture does not
infringe, then the sale will not infringe. If the patented invention is "made" and the patent is infringed,
then the sale also will infringe. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 527.
30. Id. at 530.
31. The Court read the legislative history on § 271 as dealing almost exclusively with contributory
infringement, active inducement and the problem of patent misuse. The Court found nothing stated
concerning the standard for "making," but held that the overall intent of § 271 was to codify the
existing case law. Id. at 530 n.10. See also S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 28, reprinted in
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394-95, 2402.
32. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529 (citing Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225, 229
(7th Cir. 1966)); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
1956)).
33. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528.
34. See, e.g., Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1974); AB Volvo v. EatonKenway, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (no infringement could take place until the system is
complete and in operation); Brown v. Trion Indus., 575 F. Supp. 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Sims v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (defendant not liable for manufacture and sale of a
chassis where the patent covered the whole front discharge concrete mixer); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (D.R.I. 1977) (providing the parts, the
instructions, and the inducement does not make a manufacture). But see Waters Assoc. v. Instrumentation Specialities Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 388,392 (D. Neb. 1978) ("the full import of the Deepsouth holding
is subject to at least some reasonable interpretation.").
In Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., the Sixth Circuit reversed a finding of direct infringement of a patent
on an apparatus used in hip surgery for fixation of fractures. The defendant made and stocked the parts
separately and sold them on randomly received orders but never assembled the patented combination.
496 F.2d 45.
35. 745 F.2d II (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Patent Infringement
Paper Converting Machine Company brought an infringement action in
1979 against Magna-Graphics Corporation for making and selling its
patented "sequential automatic rewinder. ' ' 36 An automatic rewinder is
widely used in the paper products industry to wind rolls of paper toweling
and toilet tissue. 37 Magna-Graphics, in assembling its first automatic
rewinder, attempted to make design changes to avoid infringing the patent.
When Paper Converting brought suit, the district court found the changes to
38
be insignificant and held that the patent had been infringed.
Magna-Graphics was at that time in the process of assembling a second
rewinder for which it had a contract of sale. Attempting to avoid a second
infringement, Magna-Graphics, on advice of counsel, 39 negotiated with
the buyer to delay delivery and final assembly of the machine until after the
patent expired. 4 After finishing production of the parts, Magna-Graphics
partially assembled the rewinder and tested the moving parts. 4 1 The tests
36. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 211 U.S.P.Q. 788 (E.D. Wis. 1981),
aff'd, 680 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1982). The original patent, No. 3,179,348, covered the sequential rewinder
approach. In 1975, the patent claims were narrowed by reissue. No. Re. 28,353 ('353 patent). The
reissue patent received the same expiration date as the original-April 20,1982.
The '353 patent essentially claimed thepushers, pads, pins, and cutting means needed to cut, impale
and glue a continuously unwinding roll of paper. The patent claimed in part the following:
1. In web-winding apparatus equipped with a frame, ...
(C) means for transversely severing said web to provide a free leading edge on said web for
approaching a mandrel on which said web is to be wound in said path, [and]
(D) pin means extensibly mounted on said roll for maintaining a web portion spaced from said
edge in contact with said roll, and pusher means extensibly mounted on said roll to urge said
maintained web portion against an adjacent mandrel ...
4. In web-winding apparatus having a frame, ...
(D) a pusher mounted in said roll for extension out of said slot to overcome said maintaining
means, said pusher being mounted rearwardly of said knife in the direction of roll rotation, and
means for sequentially extending said knife and pusher, said extending means being operative to
extend said pusher at a time when said slot is aligned with said path segment.
680 F.2d 483, 485 n. (7th Cir. 1982).
37. 745 F.2dat 13.
38. Paper Converting, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 788. The court held that Magna-Graphics had merely
reversed the position of the severing means, the knife and the pins. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
finding of liability. 680 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1982).
39. PaperConverting, 745 F.2d at 15. The advice of counsel not to assemble until after the patent
expired was clearly in line with precedent. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406
U.S. 518 (1972).
40. This renegotiation received no attention from the Paper Converting majority; yet it has real
bearing on the reasons given by the court for finding infringement. The court worried that the patent
owner lost a sale during the patent -erm, although the sale did not occur until after the patent expired.
See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
41. PaperConverting, 745 F.2d at 15. Magna-Graphics only assembled parts of each mechanism
and checked the positioning of each piece. For example, Magna-Graphics installed only two pusher
pads on the bedroll instead of the thirty pads normally used in full operation. It checked the positioning
of the pads to see whether they would contact the mandrel (the roll of new paperboard cores). During
this part of the testing no cutoff blades or pins were installed. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 60:889, 1985

involved operating only single mechanisms at a time. 42 Magna-Graphics
never completely assembled and operated the machine as a whole. 43 After
the testing, Magna-Graphics shipped the machine to the buyer in two parts.
Final assembly at the buyer's plant began six days after the patent expired
44
and required six months to complete.
The Federal Circuit articulated the issue in this case as the "extent to
which a competitor of a patentee can manufacture and test during the life of
a patent a machine intended solely for post-patent use." 45 The court held
the patent rights infringed due to the amount of testing done on the product
coupled with the sale and delivery of a "completed" machine. 46 The
machine was considered to be "completed" because it was ready for
assembly and had no significant noninfringing use. 47 The court held that a
product need not be the complete and entire invention to infringe; an
assembly sufficient for testing was enough. 48 If the manufacturer was able
to check the functionality of the device, then according to the court, the
device must have been "made" within the meaning of section 271.49
The Federal Circuit narrowly construed Deepsouth "as applicable only
to the issue of the extraterritorial effect of the American patent law. "50 The
court distinguished Deepsouth as a case in which the infringing assembly
occurred outside the patent jurisdiction, as opposed to PaperConverting, in
which the assembly occurred in the United States after the patent expired.
In refusing to apply Deepsouth to the facts in Paper Converting, the court
reasoned that a five-to-four decision of the Supreme Court demanded
caution in extension by analogy. 5 1 The court also distinguished Deepsouth
by concluding that the danger of giving extraterritorial effect to United
States patents is more troublesome than the "horror" 52 of allowing the
42. Magna-Graphics ran its tests in two stages. First, it tested the operation of the parent roll and the
positioning of the pusher pads that transferred the unwinding paper to the new shaft of cores. Second, it
checked the cutoff mechanism and the blade attachment. The second stage of testing consisted of
checking the action of the cutting blade to determine whether it properly cut the paper. For the test,
Magna-Graphics installed a four-inch blade rather than the normally used 72-inch blade. It checked the
latch mechanism to make certain it would eject the blade to cut the paper. During this testing no pins or
pusher pads were installed. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24, 26 n.2 (Nies, J., dissenting). It is clear that more was required for final assembly than
the proverbial tightening of the final screw. The rewinder was substantially reworked to conform to the
buyer's operating system. Id.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id. at 19-20.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 19-20.
50. Id. at 17.
51.

Id.

52.

Id.
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benefits of a patent to continue beyond expiration. 53 Moreover, the court
undermined Deepsouth by stating that Deepsouth misinterpreted the Andrea cases, concluding that the "making" standard that emerged from
Andrea I required something less than a full and complete assembly. 54
The PaperConverting court feared a different result would "emasculate
the congressional intent" 55 of giving a patent full effect for the term of
seventeen years. It saw the last year of a patent becoming worthless for a
long lead-time article if the law allowed a competitor to partially assemble
and test that device anytime during the patent term. 5 6 Competitors would
enter the market during the last year of the patent and contract for sales to be
finalized after the patent expired. 57 The court feared that allowing such
activity would cause the patent owner to lose a sale for the invention that it
58
would have made during the patent term but for the infringing acts.
A vigorous dissent characterized the majority opinion as "no less than a
reversal of Deepsouth.'59 It noted that Deepsouth had expressly rejected
the substantial manufacture test and concluded that the majority was
reverting to that test. 6° The dissent argued that the bright line drawn by the
"operable assembly" test in Deepsouth provided certainty in the area of
61
patent law while the majority's opinion left the issue in the dark.
III.

ANALYSIS

Paper Converting broadened the definition of infringement and increased the economic clout of a patent. The case illustrates the court's
willingness to discard old notions of patent law, such as the Deepsouth
operable assembly standard, and reshape the scope of the patent grant. The
court's new standard for determining a "making" seems to approach a
substantial manufacture test. This causes uncertainty for competitors and
for the courts, who need a bright line by which to judge conduct and
infringement. This new standard also diminishes the need for the doctrine
of contributory infringement. 62 It results in a grant of a de facto monopoly
beyond the statutory term by delaying the entry of competition in the
63
market for the patented invention.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 107-17.
745 F.2d at 24, 26 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Id.at 24.
Id. at 26.
For a discussion of the doctrine of contributory infringement, see supra note 18.
See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
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The court rebalanced the competing interests of the patent grant, giving
more weight to the interests of the patentee. In doing so, the court intruded
upon the exclusive powers of Congress to extend the patent protection. The
Federal Circuit overstepped its role by effectively rewriting the infringement section of the Patent Act. 64 The goals of patent protection would be
better served by maintaining the application of a strict operable assembly
standard as established by precedent. Without some indication from Congress that it did not accept the Deepsouth standard, the Federal Circuit
should not have enlarged the scope of patent protection.
A.

Applicability of Deepsouth

The core of Deepsouth-the operable assembly standard-should have
guided the court's decision in PaperConverting. The majority's efforts to
distinguish Deepsouth fall short. Neither the exportation context of Deepsouth nor the narrow decision 65 detract from Deepsouth's clear requirement of full operable assembly. Nor do the recent additions to section
271,66 which apply to the exportation aspect of Deepsouth, change the
basic operable assembly requirement for infringement.
Under the infringement statute in force at the time, the Deepsouth
defendant could only be liable if producing the separate parts of the
machines in this country was enough to be a "making." Defining a
"making" was the core of the decision. The Paper Converting court
mistakenly interpreted Deepsouth's operable assembly requirement to
apply only to the exportation of partial assemblies. 67 The "extraterritorial
effect" of the patent laws was never at issue. Exportation of the goods
entered the case as an issue only because it precluded a finding of contributory infringement.68 Deepsouthexplicitly stated the law as requiring a full
64. By redefining direct infringement so that it sweeps in partial assemblies, the court intruded
upon the application of the doctrine of contributory infringement. See infra text accompanying notes
100-03.

65. One way the court in PaperConverting tried to distinguish Deepsouth is by the narrow five-tofour decision in Deepsouth. See supra text accompanying note 51.
66. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(f) (West 1985). This section was added to the statute in September
1984. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
67. "Although in Deepsouth the Court at times used broad language in reaching its decision, it is
clear that Deepsouth was intended to be narrowly construed as applicable only to the issue of the
extraterritorial effect of the American patent law." PaperConverting, 745 F.2d at 17.
The court is mistaken on this point. Deepsouth cannot be read to apply "only to the issue of the
extraterritorial effect of the American patent law," because there is no extraterritorial effect, nor has
there ever been such an effect. See supra note 17. To limit Deepsouth to this issue is to say there was
never a question in the case. The Court in Deepsouth was not asked to determine if foreign assembly
counts for infringement purposes, but rather whether Deepsouth's manufacture of all the parts in the
United States was enough to be a "making."
68. The manufacture and sale of less than fully assembled devices is dealt with under the doctrine
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operable assembly of the alleged infringing device before any infringement
can be found.
PaperConverting presented the same question as did Deepsouth: were
Magna-Graphics' activities during the patent term enough to constitute a
"making"? The machine was never fully assembled in an operable condition while the patent was in force. 69 In order to find infringement, the
court held that testing a subassembly sufficed to violate the patentee's
rights. 70 The court in PaperConvertinginterpreted the Deepsouthoperable
assembly standard to be flexible. 71 But the operable assembly standard as
laid out in Deepsouth is inflexible; it permits nothing less than a completely
functioning whole to infringe a patent. 72 In holding otherwise, Paper
Converting destroyed the operable assembly standard73 and created its own
standard. The new standard closely resembles a substantial manufacture
standard, a standard explicitly rejected in Deepsouth.

ofcontributory infringement. Application of this doctrine requires a technical direct infringement by an
operable assembly. See supra note 18. Since the patent laws have no extraterritorial effect, see supra
note 17, assembly abroad is not a direct infringement. This precludes a finding of contributory
infringement.
69. This is the key factual determination. The PaperConverting opinion clearly indicated that the
claimed mechanisms were tested independently and only to a limited extent. 745 F.2d at 15. In no way
was this an operable assembly under the Deepsouth standard of a complete assembly. Testing the
individual parts on a limited scale is not testing of the whole invention. Andrea II provided the standard:
the device must be complete at the time of testing to be an infringement. Radio Corp. of America v.
Andrea, 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937). See supra note 29.
70. Where, as here, significant, unpatented assemblies of elements are tested during the patent
term, enabling the infringer to deliver the patented combination in parts to the buyer, without
testing the entire combination together, as was the infringer's usual practice, testing the
assemblies can be held to be in essence testing the patented combination and, hence, infringement.
PaperConverting, 745 F.2d at 19-20.
71. Id. at 18.
is probably something short of a
It does seem as if the concept of an "operable assembly" ..
full and complete assembly; thus, if the infringer makes an "operable assembly" of the
components of the patented invention, sufficient for testing, it need not be the same thing as the
complete and entire invention.
72. Deepsouth clearly rejected a substantial manufacture test and any movement in that direction.
"We cannot endorse the view that the substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of a machine
constitutes infringement when we have so often held that a combination patent protects only against the
operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts." Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). Deepsouth also clearly adopted the strict Andrea I view of
"made" as a final operable assembly where all the elements are associated together to form the patented
combination. Id. at 528-29.
73. After discounting Deepsouth's reliance onAndreal, the PaperConverting court concluded that
an operable assembly is probably something short of a full and complete assembly. 745 F.2d at 18.
However, the operable assembly standard by its nature only has force as long as it is strictly applied. It is
not flexible but unyielding. Adoption of any lesser standard is merely adoption of a form of substantial
manufacture as a standard for infringement.
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Since the PaperConverting decision, Congress indicated its concern for
the result in Deepsouth by adding a new subsection to section 27174 that
addresses the exportation of partial assemblies. 75 Section 271 (f) states that

the act of exporting a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention that actively induces an infringing combination of the components is itself an infringement of the patent. 76 Under this provision, the
exportation of the shrimp deveining devices in Deepsouth would have
infringed the patent because the conduct actively induced formation of the
infringing combination abroad. 77 Section 271(f), however, does not affect
the operable assembly standard for "making." It still requires an assembly
abroad that would infringe the patent if done in the United States. This
implies that the traditional operable assembly of the patented invention
must occur abroad before the exportation of the unassembled components

is an infringement. 78 Congress apparently felt no need to redefine the
operable assembly standard in section 271.79

74.
75.

35 U.S.C.A. § 271(f) (West 1985).
The legislative history explains the purpose of § 271(f):

The . . . change . . . will prevent copiers from avoiding United States patents by supplying

components of a patented product in this country so that the assembly of the components may be
completed abroad. This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), concerning the need for a
legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law. . . . Subsection 271(f) makes it an
infringement to supply components of a patented invention, or to cause components to be
supplied, that are to be combined outside the United States.
130 CONG. REC. H 10525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 6286, submitted
by Rep. Kastenmeier).
76. Section 271(f)(1) reads:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C.A. § 271(f)(1) (West 1985).
77. The active inducement concept is taken from the existing law of § 27 1(b). This concept also
requires a direct infringement. The statute now reaches the exportation of components that actively
induce an infringing combination. Exportation of a substantial portion of the components is enough to
infringe. See 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 16.0217], at 16-23 (1985).
78. Section 271(f)(1) requires that the parts be assembled outside the United States "in a manner
that would infringe if such combination occurred within the United States." 35 U.S.C. A. § 271(f)(1)
(West 1985).
79. Congress could have easily responded to Deepsouth by explicitly changing the operable
assembly standard. Instead, it resolved the problem in such a manner that left the standard untouched.
There is no indication that Congress knew of the PaperConverting decision that was decided only a few
weeks before the statute was finally passed. If it took Congress twelve years to react to Deepsouth. it is
unlikely Congress incorporated the Paper Converting decision into the changes in § 271, especially
since certiorari was still possible to the Supreme Court.
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B.

Upsetting the CongressionalBalance

In establishing the patent system, Congress struck a balance between the
competing interests of the inventor and the general public. 80 Congress
balanced the patentee's interest in the length and the extent of the patent
protection against the public interest in full exploitation of new inventions.8 1 In thejudgment of Congress, the grant of exclusive rights for a term
of seventeen years provides the necessary incentive for inventors to disclose
their inventions. 82 To be fair to the consuming public, however, the scope of
patent protection must be kept within prescribed limits. The operable
assembly standard extends patent protection only to the whole assembly
and prevents control over any grouping of elements short of the whole
combination. 83 Congress intended to place limits on patent protection by
including the operable assembly standard within the meaning of "making"
in section 271(a).
Congress knew of the Andrea decisions 84 when it enacted the Patent Act
of 1952.85 It did not disapprove of the strict application of the operable
assembly standard in those cases. 86 Since 1952, Congress has repeatedly
amended the Patent Act. 87 Most recently, Congress added a new definition
to the infringement section in the fall of 1984.88 Congress certainly knew of
the application of the operable assembly standard yet did not change the
law. The courts should leave to Congress the task of determining whether
the operable assembly standard is too harsh. If it is, then as the Court noted
80. The Constitution gives authority to Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent grant represents an
exchange of a bundle of exclusive rights for seventeen years from the state for the inventor's immediate
disclosure and the later unlimited public exploitation of the invention. This monopolistic grant
promotes the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" by providing the necessary economic incentive to
find and bring new inventions out of the closet and onto the market. See W. BowMAN, PATENT AND
ANTrrRtJsT LAW 2-3 (1973).
81. See White, supra note 8, at 840-43; see also Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S.
249 (1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
The aim of the patent laws is not only that members of the public shall be free to manufacture the
product or employ the process disclosed by the expired patent, but also that the consuming public
at large shall receive the benefits of the unrestricted exploitation, by others, of its disclosures. . . . By the force of the patent laws . . . is the invention of a patent dedicated to the
public upon its expiration . ...
Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255, 256.
82. See supra note 80.
83. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
86. See supra note 31.
87. Significant amendments were passed in 1961, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1982, and 1984.
88. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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in Deepsouth, Congress alone has the authority to broaden the patent
89
privilege and narrow the area of public use.
PaperConverting intrudes upon the prerogative of Congress by redefining the patent balance in favor of the patentee. By requiring less than full
operable assembly, the court takes from the public the right to assemble
parts of the patented invention and includes it within the patentee's exclusive rights. This result goes beyond the congressional indications of the
intended scope of the patent.
C.

Paper Converting's Standard

In holding the "making" standard to be something less than a full and
complete assembly, PaperConverting turns one of the few bright lines of
patent law into a dark maze of uncertainty. Whatever the objections to the
Deepsouth standard, 90 the operable assembly standard represented a clear
test by which to judge infringement. With this test there was no guessing as
to when the "heart" of the invention or the most significant parts of the
invention had been "captured" by the alleged infringer. Competitors and
the courts can with more certainty delineate the limits of patent protection
under the operable assembly standard.
Paper Converting's standard, on the other hand, is unclear. It is not
certain whether the testing of subassemblies was the critical factor, or
whether the court really was objecting to the manufacture of the components. 91 The court felt the machines met the operable assembly requirement
because they were "completed," defining "completed" as ready for assembly with no useful noninfringing pu;pose. 92 The court also emphasized the
fact that Magna-Graphics made a sale of the patented machine that would
have gone to the patent owner if the infringement had not occurred. 93 In a
sense, the court seems to have added up "wrongs" to find infringement. It
89.

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).

90. The main objections can be found in the Deepsouth dissent, id. at 532 (Blackmun, J..
dissenting), and in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the case, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.. 443
F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 518 (1972). Primarily, the objections are that it takes away a
portion of the patentee's protection and in so doing thwarts the constitutional intent of promoting the
disclosure of inventions. These are the standard objections to any limitation placed on patent coverage
by the courts. Congress, however, has considered these objections in balancing the competing interests
of the patent grant. The congressional balance includes the operable assembly standard. See supra notes
80-89 and accompanying text.
91. The court coupled the testing of the rewinder with the sale and delivery of a "completed"
machine and declared that together they constitute infringement. Paper Converting Machine Co. v.
Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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coupled the testing of the partial assemblies and the delivery of a "completed" machine with the loss of a sale to the patent owner to conclude that
the exclusive rights of the patent suffered too much intrusion. It is impossible to discern what the court saw as the "major wrong" and whether such
activity alone constituted infringement.
Paper Converting also injected additional subjectivity into the determination of infringement. PaperConverting's concept of a "completed"
machine implies that patent protection is given to some combination of
parts of the patented invention. This forces a court to use its subjective
judgment as to which parts of the patent deserve protection. 94 Applying
such subjectivity to an already unclear standard makes it very difficult for
competitors, the public or the courts to determine what is protected by a
patent and what activities infringe. Patent law requires greater certainty
than this approach allows.
The Federal Circuit is in a unique position to chart the course of patent
law. 95 Indeed, with only limited Supreme Court review, 96 it has a license to
develop the law in this area. Congress created the Federal Circuit to bring
97
greater uniformity and consistency to the law of intellectual property.
Instead, decisions like PaperConverting indicate a willingness of the court
to discard established precedents and chart a new unsteady course. The
decision reveals that no patent standard or doctrine is impregnable, leaving
patent law on an unsure footing. The court's concept of infringement is
obviously in transition and Paper Converting indicates the court will cut
deeper into the activities of competitors and further expand patent protection.
D.

The DetrimentalEffect on ContributoryInfringement

Direct infringement is the backbone of the statutory infringment
scheme. Redefining the scope of direct infringement causes a realignment
of the related infringement doctrines. 98 The broader definition of infringement in Paper Converting diminishes the need for the doctrine of contributory infringement. 99
94. See supra note 21.
95. See supra note 2.
96. In creating the Federal Circuit, Congress recognized that the Supreme Court was operating at
full capacity and could not be expected to take more patent cases. At the same time, controversies in
patent law continue to grow in number and in complexity. See supra note 2.
97. S. REP., supra note 2, at 1-5.
98. See 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 17.01 (1984).
99. See supra note 18.
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Contributory infringement protects the patentee from a harsh application of the operable assembly standard by placing within the patentee's
exclusive control all components of the invention that have no significant
noninfringing use. 100 The doctrine, however, places a limit on this protection by requiring a direct infringement by operable assembly before contributory liability can be imposed. 101 In contrast, the substantial manufacture test requires only partial assembly in determining infringement and
does not consider the eventual total construction. It would not matter if the
machine were eventually noninfringing as long as at some point "substantial manufacture" of the invention occurred. 10 2 This standard removes
potentially noninfringing devices from public use. Under a substantial
manufacture standard for "making," contributory infringement is subsumed under a broader definition of direct infringement, 10 3 voiding the
existing statutory scheme for determining infringement.
The court in Paper Converting was faced with activities that were
permitted under the previous interpretation of the infringement statute.
Magna-Graphics' actions would have been direct infringement had final
assembly taken place while the patent was still in force. Its actions would
have been contributory infringement had the buyer refused to wait and had
assembled the machine while the patent was still in force. Since neither
occurred, the court should have found no infringement to be consistent with
the statutory scheme. Instead, the court bent the doctrine of direct infringement to remedy a perceived injustice-a lost sale of the patented invention
104
during the patent term.
By lowering the threshold for direct infringement, the court in Paper
Converting diminished the need for the doctrine of contributory infringement. Not only did this lower standard upset the congressional statutory
scheme for infringement, but it also granted a greater degree of patent
protection than provided by the doctrine of contributory infringement.
100. Section 27 1(c) codified the existing case law requiring that the device not be a staple article or
one suitable for substantial noninfringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). See supra note 18.
101. See supra note 18.
102. The Paper Converting court was not concerned with whether the final assembly as modified
infringed the patent. The final assembly could not infringe because the patent had expired. The changes
made to accommodate the buyer could have taken the device out from under the patent claims. The
court, however, was only concerned with whether, at the time of testing, there was sufficient resemblance to infringe.
103. Under a substantial manufacture test, for example, the kerosene lamp of Wallace v. Holmes.
29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100), would have been enough of an assembly to be a direct
infringement, eliminating the need for contributory infringment. See supra note 18.
104. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 16 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
"We notice, but Magna-Graphics adds that it is totally irrelevant, that Paper Converting has lost, during
the term of its patent, a contract for the patented machine which it would have received but for the
competitor's acts." Id.
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E. Restrictions on Preparationsfor Post-ExpirationMarket Entry

The court in PaperConverting was very concerned that the patentee had
lost a sale for the patented invention during the patent term. 105 The court
concluded that the patent owner lost control over the last year of the patent
under a strict application of the operable assembly standard. 06 On the
surface, application of a strict operable assembly test may appear to allow a
competitor to take some of the benefit of the patent away from the patentee.10 7 In practice, however, the operable assembly standard takes
nothing from the patent grant. The patentee still exercises control over sales
of devices to be completed during the patent term. 108 The operable assembly standard does allow competitors to make preparations during the patent
term that facilitate market entry soon after the patent expires. On the other
hand, Paper Converting's standard limits competitors' preparations and
results in a grant of a de facto monopoly after the patent expires.
Upon expiration of the patent, an invention becomes available for full
public use and exploitation. 10 9 A competitor of the patent owner has the full
right to place an exact duplicate of the product on the market immediately
after the patent expires. 1 0 Prior case law consistently applied the operable
assembly standard and allowed all preparations for post-expiration market
entry short of actual "making" or "using" during the patent term. For
example, contracting to make or sell an infringing article was not itself an
infringement even though it displaced a contract that otherwise would have,

105. PaperConverting, 745 F.2d at 19.
106. Id.
107. A strict application of operable assembly would allow competitors to partially assemble
during the patent term in preparation for market entry after expiration of the patent. For economic
reasons these preparations would most likely come in the last year of the patent term. Thus, Paper
Converting argued that such strict application would erode the last year of the patent.
108. See supra note 8.
109. See supra note 81.
110. See, e.g., White v. Walbridge, 46 F. 526 (C.C.D. Vt. 1891).
The defendant has on hand and is making more lens-holder blanks, which can be completed into
those that would infringe or those that would not; and has advertised that he would furnish those of
the patent at reduced prices after the expiration of the patent . . . . Till completed, these things
would not infringe, and when completed the patent will not be in force to be infringed. The
[patentee] has a monopoly of making, using, and vending to others to be used, during the term only
of the patent. Everyone else has the right to do anything as to that during that term which stops
short of the patented article itself, and to come to that as soon as may be after the expiration of the
term by any preparation which does not amount to that before. This leaves to him all that his patent
covers, and to others what it does not cover.
Id.
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gone to the patentee. 11'Nor were advertising, 112 displaying, 113 and soliciting sales 14 of the patented invention considered to be intrusions upon the
patentee's rights. Even partial delivery before the patent expired did not
infringe. 115 Under the traditional operable assembly standard, a competitor
could collect the component parts and have them ready for assembly and
sale of the completed article immediately after the patent expired.
This standard allows competitors to cut off the effects of a patent at
expiration. The patentee, however, benefits from a similar standard at the
beginning of the patent term. The grant of a patent cuts off all unauthorized
making and using of the patented invention. Any buyer who purchased the
device from someone other than the patentee before the patent issued is
prevented from using it during the patent term. This prevents, in effect, any
development of the patented device for months prior to the issuance of the
patent. Therefore, any seeming injustice resulting from the application of
the traditional operable assembly at the end of the patent is balanced by a
benefit at the beginning.
The Paper Converting court felt that allowing preparations like those of
Magna-Graphics robbed the patentee of the full right to the market for the
patented machine. The facts of the case, however, reveal no loss of the
ability to control the sales of the machine during the statutory period.
Magna-Graphics bargained with the buyer to postpone the sale until after
the patent expired. 116 If the buyer wanted a machine in operation prior to
that time, it could have purchased from the patentee. It agreed instead to
buy a noninfringing machine to be delivered after the expiration of the
I11. In Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & Fixture Co., 293 F. 261, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1920), Judge Learned Hand wrote:
IT]he question [is] whether it was an infringement for the defendant to take away from the plaintiff
a contract calling for a door covered by the patent, and later to change the structure so that it did not
infringe. . . . [The patentee] may prevent any one from making, selling, or using a structure
embodying the invention, but the monopoly goes no further than that. . . . If, therefore, anyone
says to a possible customer of a patentee, "I will make the article myself; don't buy of the
patentee," while he may be doing the patentee a wrong, . . . the promise itself is not part of the
conduct which the patent forbids: it is not a subtraction from the monopoly . . . [P]erhaps it is a
wrong. . . but certainly it is not an infringement of the patent.
Id. at 262. See also Marine Electric Corp. v. Vapor Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 362 (N.D. Il1. 1979) (a
contract to manufacture that which would infringe is not infringement).
112. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981):
Molinaro v. Sonar Radio Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 901, 904-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
113. Brennan v. Mr. Hanger, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Knapp-Monarch Co. v.
Casco Prods. Corp., 342 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 828 (1965).
114. Kirsch Co. v. Edgecraft Corp., 193 U.S.P.Q. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
115. Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng'g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Conn. 1979).
116. As described in Van Kannell Revolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & Fixture Co., 293 F.
261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), it is not an infringement to induce the buyer to modify his requirements (in
this case the time of delivery) to avoid infringement.
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patent. Magna-Graphics had an absolute right to sell the rewinder after the
patent expired. Paper Converting did not lose the last year of the patent. It
still enjoyed the rights to make, use or sell the completed machine until the
117
very end of the seventeen year period.
By preventing these preparations, Paper Converting created a de facto
monopoly that extends beyond the statutory period. It protects the patentee
for the additional length of time necessary for competitors to prepare for
production and place a product on the market. This de facto monopoly
118
eschews the balancing already done by Congress in the patent grant.
Congress decided to limit the patent control to seventeen years. The patent
laws dedicate the invention to public use immediately upon expiration of
the patent. 119 In attempting to protect the patentee's rights for the full patent
term, the court's decision actually extended those rights beyond the expiration of the patent.
PaperConverting cited another recent Federal Circuit case, Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 120 as compelling its result. In
Roche, the court held that Bolar's use of Roche's patented drug in FDArequired testing, which was intended solely to facilitate Bolar's post-patent
market entry, infringed the patent. 121 Paper Converting cited Roche as
support for the fact that "use" infringement includes testing a product in
preparation for post-patent market entry. 122 The court then concluded that
Magna-Graphics' testing of the partial assemblies fell within this rule
23
because the purpose of the use was the same as that in Roche. 1
The PaperConverting court, however, failed to recognize the key distinction between Magna-Graphics' testing and the testing of the drug in
Roche. In Roche, Bolar's use of the complete patented invention in the
testing was clear, and the question before the court was whether the purpose
of the use exempted it from infringement. 124 Roche holds that using the
fully assembled patented invention for the purpose of facilitating
117. As long as no one is able to make use of the partially assembled device until after the patent
expires, what loss has the patentee suffered? The only loss is a post-expiratioft sale-an event
predetermined by the patent grant. See supra note 81.
118. The balancing grants the public the right to fully exploit the patent upon its expiration in
exchange for the seventeen year monopoly. See supra notes 80-81.
119. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
120. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
121. Id.
122. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 18-19 (Fed. Cir.
1984).

123. Id.
124. Roche, 733 F2d at 862-65. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, the defendant, sought to have the use
excepted from infringement based on an experimental purpose or a public policy exemption, but the
court held that these exceptions did not exempt the testing from infringing. Id.
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post-patent market entry does not prevent a finding of infringement. 125 In
Paper Converting, however, the question is not whether testing of a complete invention for post-patent market entry should be exempted, but
whether the patented invention was ever present in the first place. The
similarity of the purpose of the testing-preparation for market entry after
the patent expires-therefore does not control.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A patent grants exclusive rights to the patent owner in exchange for
disclosure of the invention and later unlimited public use of the device. The
traditional operable assembly standard served to limit that grant by allowing the patentee to control only fully assembled and operable articles that
include all the elements claimed in the invention. The Supreme Court
specifically applied this standard in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp. The traditional operable assembly standard is consistent with the
other doctrines of patent law. It provides a bright line by which to determine
infringement. It also allows competitors to prepare to enter the market for
the patented invention immediately after the patent expires.
The PaperConverting standard, on the other hand, expands the powers
of the patentee to exclude all items that represent the "heart" of the
invention. It requires less than full final assembly and approaches the
substantial manufacture test. PaperConverting's standard is uncertain and
leads to a more subjective test for judging infringing activity. Substantial
manufacture requires a guess by the court that the object as assembled will
infringe in final form. It also emasculates the doctrine of contributory
infringement. This test was specifically rejected in Deepsouth.
PaperConverting gave the patentee overly broad powers to control the
market both during the patent term and after the patent expires. This grant
of a de facto monopoly and the ability of the patentee to control competitor
preparations for post-patent market entry upsets the congressional balancing in the Patent Act. The invention is available for full public exploitation
upon expiration of the patent. The patentee's control over the invention
ends with expiration of the patent just as the public use ended with the grant
125. Id. The court held that the testing was not within the traditional limits of the experimental use
doctrine since it was a commercially valuable use-even though the value would be realized after the
patent expired. Id. at 862-63. The court declined to resolve the public policy question, leaving it instead
to Congress. Id. at 863-65. Congress subsequently addressed the problem presented in Roche in title II
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, tit. 11, 98
Stat. 1598-99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The statute provides for
extension of patents that have lost some of their effective term due to a delay in FDA approval. It also
greatly reduces the testing required before a generic copy of a previously FDA-approved drug can be
placed on the market.
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of the patent. The operable assembly standard for "making" gives effect to
this balancing of the interests and should have been maintained by the court
in Paper Converting.
Absent congressional action to change the law, the Federal Circuit
should have stayed within the guidelines set by the Deepsouth opinion.
PaperConverting left patent infringement on uncertain ground. Patent law
would benefit by a quick return to the certainty of the strict operable
assembly standard instead of being left to flounder in the wake of Paper
Converting.
Stuart Watt

